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We will show in this paper how the process of delivering mobile content to handsets has changed 
from proprietary delivery mechanisms towards components making up delivery platforms. This 
trend is reinforced by content formats migrating from mobile-specific into mainstream Internet 
formats as handsets get more advanced. Service delivery platforms function as an indicator of the 
uptake of data services and is the glue between end-users and the originating content. Service 
delivery platforms also drive a convergence between IT and telecoms companies. This means 
lower transaction costs for major brands to expand into mobile content distribution. 
 
In this paper we compare business strategies and technology choices from Japan and the EU in 
the period 2000 to 2005 among the following actors: carriers, mobile content providers, service 
delivery platform providers, and retail brands. Although different business strategies have been 
pursued in Japan and the EU we show that underlying key delivery technology is similar, and the 
patterns of IT and telecoms convergence are clear. This analysis also demystifies the content 
delivery process in Japan. 
 
We use both concepts of network effects and systems evolution to explore how content provision 
has changed in the market to accommodate evolving service delivery platforms, containing 
disruptive technologies, and the associated business models, that are affected by coordination 
costs. This research is built on extensive industry contacts in Japan during two periods, 1999-
2001 and 2002-2005. 
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1. Introduction 
To explain the success and hurdles of mobile Internet services in Japan and the West, Funk 
(2001, 2004) uses the concepts of network effects (Shapiro & Varian, 1999) and disruptive 
technologies (Christensen, 1997) that we will adopt in this paper. Patterns of industry 
convergence are generally thought to occur at a number of different levels: the product-market 
level, the technology level and the firm level (von Tunzelmann, 1988). Mobile phone products 
are increasingly compatible with standard Internet file formats (MP3, MPEG,  
Real, and windows formats) and the technology richness of high-end phone contents are getting 
close to that of the fixed-line Internet, while keeping the mobile-phone’s near-ubiquitous 
geographical reach. On the product and technology level most handsets in 2005 combined 
camera and media player functionalities. We claim that industry convergence between IT and 
telecoms, at the firm level is increasingly being achieved through standardisation and the 
dissemination among actors possessing competences in mobile service delivery technologies. 
This paper utilises “coordination costs” (Clemons et al, 1993) to provide a study lens to view the 
content value chain in Japan and the EU. This study lens enables us to identify actors and their 
business strategies enacted between 2000 and 2005 in both markets. The business strategy 
includes the positioning in the value chain and technology choices in content delivery activities 
among actors. Hughes’ (1983) technology system approach, and the view of innovation as 
overcoming reverse salients, is used to describe the current status of mobile service delivery 
platforms within the mobile Internet technology system. 
 
Disruptive technologies improve certain product features while sacrificing others, and are  
typically more appropriate for new customers than existing ones. Christensen’s (1997) study of 
the hard disk drive industry in the 1970s and 1980s, found disruptive technologies at work, as 
established manufacturers were not interested in supplying smaller disk drives, with smaller 
memory (and margins) while new entrants took the new customers. This trend was repeated for 
minicomputers, PCs and laptops. However, Funk (2004) notes that some technologies are 
disruptive for some incumbents and not for others, depending on previous technology base and 
choices: Sharp and Seiko commercialized LCDs faster than RCA (who was the first firm to 
develop LCDs) since this new technology was not disruptive for one of their current markets 
(calculators that required low power consumption) while it was disruptive for computers 
(insufficient speed), which was the main market for semiconductors in the US. Another aspect of 
disruptive technologies is their starting point from a lower performance level, and what 
Christensen et al (2002) calls “overshoot” the demands and expectations of customers when 
entering the mass market. Disruptive technologies often offer a higher performance increase than 
the industry average. This would ensure a certain performance “margin” in new innovation from 
disruptive technology and partly explain why an industry does not take on a homogenous 
technology form.  
 
Network externalities, increasing returns and path dependencies can be summarized as network 
effects. In short, interconnected actors are affected by each other (positively or negatively), even 
if they are only indirectly connected (Shapiro & Varian, 1999). The value of a network increases 
with the number of actors connected, in our case the number of handsets that can easily be 
reached by one service delivery platform. Innovation is often described as path dependent where 
innovators and users accumulate sunk costs and become locked-in. If a user base is tied to a 
technological standard, increasing returns therefore applies to the standard too. This can be 
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summarised in a standards reinforcement mechanism which also explains how a standard that 
builds up an early install base before competitors create path dependency among customers 
(Grindley, 1995) 
 
“Coordination costs” is the cost incurred by the firm in coordinating with other organisations or 
potentially pricing the product (Clemons et al, 1993). The term coordination cost is interpreted in  
a broader sense to include the cost of exchanging information and incorporating that information 
into decision processes, as well as the cost incurred by the firm due to delays in the 
communication channel. Typically a good IT infrastructure, such as email, Internet, and common 
databases decreases the coordination costs.  
 
“Reverse salients” are used by Hughes (1983) to explain how technical innovation focus around 
the elimination of obstacles to growth, called reverse salients. Technical artifacts are typically 
part of a technological system (the mobile Internet in our case), where growth patterns are driven 
by a need to maximise the load factor (the ratio of average usage, which determines revenue) 
until a peak is reached, which determines the necessary capital investment. Hence innovation can 
be seen as a system of interdependent technology components gradually moving forward as 
pockets of resistance (reverse salients) to system innovation are overcome. 
 
Following a description of key characteristics of service delivery platforms we give a brief 
history to how the mobile Internet developed in Japan and the EU, showing the importance of 
content delivery, and identify key players. Then we describe their business strategies. Thirdly we 
identify the key technologies of mobile service delivery, and show that components are 
increasingly becoming standardized in this previously fragmented part of the mobile industry.    
 
2. Key Characteristics of Mobile Service Delivery 
The major technologies enabling the mobile Internet can be thought to be, and include the 
interfaces between: Infrastructure networks, handsets, and service (or content) delivery systems. 
Both infrastructure networks and handsets have entered a high level of standardisation across 
markets, and mass production for the global market. But service delivery platforms are only 
partly standardised, and only recently started to develop from proprietary and local systems, 
towards generic modules and the mass market. In Hughes’ (1983) terms, content delivery 
systems are technology components currently defined as a “reverse salient” to the further take off 
and dissemination of the mobile Internet. Massive resources are currently being invested by all 
four key actors to achieve new service delivery innovations that would enable a higher output of 
the whole mobile Internet system. Strategy Analytics (2005) estimate that US$175m is being 
invested worldwide in SDPs in 2005 and US$325m in 2007, then rising to US$375m in 2008. 
Much technical progress have been done since 1999 but the service delivery platforms could still 
be seen as a reverse salient on its way to be corrected.  
 
When the mobile Internet became available around 1999 in both the EU and Japan, delivering 
content was a disruptive set of technologies for all content holders but new content start-ups. 
None of the contents (images, sound, text) used on the Internet could easily be applied on mobile 
phones due to different browsers, mark-up language, file formats, or due to general constraints 
from the handsets. For users the content was expensive, difficult to use, and of poor quality. We  
argue that continuing standardisation and convergence of content formats and delivery 
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technologies have been instrumental in providing the basis for new business models. This makes 
the mobile Internet decreasingly disruptive for several actors in the mobile delivery value chain, 
and will spur new entrants. Funk claims (2004) the mobile Internet can still be disruptive for PC 
Internet content providers, as they must simplify their contents for small screens and keyboards, 
thereby creating a discontinuity with the previous service. Funk continues by showing how this 
enabled new entrants into for example mobile shopping, by firms who are relatively weak in the 
PC Internet like Tsutaya Online (records, books) and Index (perfume) in Japan. In this way 
technologies can be disruptive for some firms and not others.  
 
As new content delivery technologies enable PC (and other) actors to deliver content to already 
existing phones on the market, network effects support an increasing value for mobile service 
delivery technologies, providing a positive feed-back process between users and providers. Due 
to previous success the EU carriers and service providers focused on business users and 
expensive devices for their first WAP services (business users and roaming was the most 
profitable user segment). Partly for the same reasons, (Japanese companies rarely provide 
employees with business phones) Japanese carriers had an early success among entertainment 
contents, with service providers early setting their targets on young users and consumers. There 
was also an early focus on performance-based positioning of contents in the i-mode portal, which 
provided trust with the users and clear incentives for content providers. Overall, Japanese 
carriers were quicker in interpreting signals of network effects and positive feed-back from 
consumers than its European counterparts. As a contrast, the low replacement rate of handsets 
and lacking customer relationship management from carriers towards service providers in 
Scandinavia (the leading GSM market at the time) exemplify how network effects were kept 
back from work in 1999 to 2002 in the EU (Kärrberg & Sigurdson, 2002). 
 
In our analysis we have chosen the following six activities as markers of the content delivery 
value chain:  
 
Content ownership: The creation and possession of analogue/digital contents 
Content aggregation: Aggregation, pre-formatting and storage of content for the purpose of 
service delivery 
Service delivery: To deliver contents in the right format to any handset. 
Billing mediation: Charge any customer for contents according to regulations and purchase event. 
Portal management: To present an attractive portal where users consume contents. Deployment 
of search engines displaying the portal’s content in a compelling way. 
Content approval, network access: Approval process and guidelines for content before going live 
on the carrier network. 
 




This division serves our purpose of describing how actors have changed their value chain focus 
(business strategy) between year 2000 and 2005 in Japan and the EU. 
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In the selection process of actors to study, one comes up with the key industry actors: carriers, 
handset makers, infrastructure makers, content providers, retail brand makers, enablers, and users. 
However, from a content delivery point of view, networks are owned and managed by the 
carriers, and the handsets are either the same to all carriers as in the EU or procured and 
developed jointly with the carriers, as in Japan. In the perspective of content delivery, handsets 
and networks are included in the business strategy of the carrier. We therefore choose to focus 
our analysis on four actors: carriers, content providers (also called content aggregators), enablers 
(called service delivery platform providers), and retail brand makers. Handsets and infrastructure 
features are exogenous factors for all actors but the carriers, so we inscribe it in the carrier 
business strategy. Users, their preferences, and other demand factors are assumed to be taken 
into account by the business strategies of all four actors. Especially, we look at technology 
choice as part of the business strategy, and map the activities in figure 1 against underlying 




The independent technologies used within each activity are explained below: 
 
Ingestion: Analogue and digital contents converted into suitable digital format 
Compression: Digital raw contents need to be trans-coded into all needed formats fitting the 
numerous handsets 
Content management system: When compressed into the right formats, contents are stored in a 
content management system. 
Meta data capture: Content is wrapped in descriptive data, such as “title”, “file name”, “author” 
etc, that is needed when displaying and managing it correctly. 
Device discovery: From the user agent, the SDP can identify the handset. 
On-the-fly trans-coding: For images, an on-the-fly trans-coding can be done from one raw file 
into the format fitting a certain user profile. 
DRM: Before being delivered contents are wrapped in metadata deciding what rights the user has 
(e.g. forward-lock). Depending on handset capabilities, this should be acted upon by the SDP. 
Download manager: It is necessarily to handle unstable connections, communication between 
java clients and the SDP, and the actual download mechanism that varies. 
Media player: To deliver streaming, MMS contents and other special formats to the handset. 
Billing mediation: To check if the user has money to spend, and log his purchases with the 
carrier who provides the monthly statement/subtracts from prepaid user accounts. 
Site builder: To avoid coding in multiple mark-up languages, or simply drag-and-drop design 
systems. Site-builders automate this process. 
Search engine: When new content is added, it is being registered in the search engine, content 
providers can bid for key words, and users easily find what they look for 
Third party management: Carriers and MVNOs (Mobile Virtual Network Operators) with tens of 
suppliers can automate the sign-up process of suppliers, enforcement of SLAs (Service Level 
Agreements) for bandwidth usage among others. 
 
Limitations to realigning activities and acquire technologies in the value chain are represented in 
this paper by coordination costs for vertical integration and horizontal cooperation.   
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3. Technology Standards & Initial Business Strategies, 1999-2002 
When comparing the EU and Japan the first major difference is in the usage of GSM versus PDC 
as the network standard. At a first look, it would seem as the EU had a head-start as GSM is a 
global standard and PDC is not. The first mobile Internet services in 1999 focused on 
information services both in Japan and the EU, as carriers believed business users would drive 
revenues. But as Funk (2004) points out, the mobile Internet acted as a disruptive technology for 
existing and advanced Internet applications (business usage), whereas simple entertainment 
content (consumers) were much easier to enable and sell. High coordination costs in Europe kept 
content providers from expanding cross-boarder sales, as incumbents all had different billing 
systems, portal policies and regulations. So it turns out the larger size of the EU market didn’t 
have any positive effects for the mobile Internet compared to Japan in the starting phase. There 
are many  similarities when looking back in time: Both markets were pioneering the mobile 
Internet, and WAP even had a head start over i-mode (and WAP was adopted by KDDI, the 
second carrier) as a mark-up language. Handsets had black and white screens and no ring tones 
or java games were available in Japan or the EU during launch in 1999. Messaging, the “killer 
application”, took off already back in the mid-90s as the first data application in both markets, 
and still in 2005 provide most of the non-voice revenues.  
 
There are also clear structural differences: The market fragmentation and power struggle that 
took place in Europe between handset makers and carriers didn’t take place in Japan. From the 
beginning PDC ensured that no roaming to other countries was possible, so the Japanese handset 
makers became suppliers to the carrier handset wholesale departments, especially to the giant 
Nippon Telecom and Telegraph (NTT) and its daughter company DoCoMo. The “always-on” 
packet networks (GPRS) in Japan were not available until 2002 in most EU markets. Another 
major difference was the clear value proposition that Japanese carriers offered compared to EU 
carriers.  
 
Network effects explain how these important differences became magnified into success in Japan 
and a conceived failure in the EU. Feed-back processes (Grindley, 1995) in Japan early produced 
a few profitable content providers, that inspired other content providers, more users signed up, 
and carriers (NTT DoCoMo mainly) expanded its content departments. An existing world-class 
cluster of entertainment service companies in Tokyo (gaming, animations, karaoke) also 
contributed to a rapid mobilisation of production resources into the new mobile Internet 
distribution channel (Kärrberg & Marnung, 2001).  
 
 
4. The Value Chain Evolves: Service Delivery Platforms 2002-2005  
The internationalization of content sales in the EU (and bureaucratic carrier organisations) gave 
birth to the SMS and WAP brokers, an industry actor still unknown in Japan (in 2005) as off-
portal billing is not possible. Content aggregators specializing in carrier relations developed both 
in Japan and the EU, but didn’t take off in the EU until 2001 with premium SMS. Specialized 
content providers emerged both in Japan and the EU before 2000, when Japanese content 
providers brought established brands to the mobile business (Bandai/Disney, Cybird/Popeye, 
SEGA), whereas many EU content providers (CPs) tried to create their own contents. The 
service delivery platform market emerged in Japan as a clear industry segment in 2002-2005, 
whereas the EU roaming challenge early on called for these systems to efficiently connect 
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service providers to multiple carriers in different markets. A strong trend is for retail brands to 
build their own portals in the EU and charge for content via premium SMS, without dealing 
directly with carriers. The carrier portals are gradually decreasing as entry point and customer 
education arena in the EU.  
 
Advertising and retail brand makers are increasingly using both mobile marketing and Internet 
web pages for an optimal media mix of  geographical “reach” and content “richness” (Funk, 
2004). Firms are compensating for the low richness of the mobile Internet by integrating it with 
other media. As the mobile Internet has been a disruptive technology and not easy to integrate 
with other media until recently, mobile advertising has been done separately. The only area at the 
moment seemingly far away from PC and mobile phone convergence is gaming, due to user 
interface restrictions and the usage of handset-specific java files. 
 
In both the EU and Japan, service delivery platforms have not yet overshot the functional needs 
(Christensen et al, 2002), as most customers ask for customized solutions. This is partly due to 
the fact that no dominant design has yet emerged for coordinating underlying technologies in 
service delivery platforms. SDP providers have worked hard to offer the underlying technologies 
in fig. 2 as independent modules with connecting APIs. But the typical sales options still consist 
of either new customers (typically media retail brands, such as TV, radio, entertainment) willing 
to accept the disruptive technology, or established customers who either demand very high 
services levels (typically carriers) and/or extensive integration with existing systems (typically 
content aggregators). As the underlying technologies increasingly deal with standard Internet 
content formats, we argue that the boundaries between underlying delivery technologies blur, 
which would inspire vertical integration (Christensen et al, 2002). But the SDP product 
boundaries (the perception among customer what functionality they want from the “black box”) 
could increasingly become modularised as dominant product designs will emerge, which would 
imply room for horizontal disintegration. Nevertheless, a tendency in the market during 2005 
was to address the reverse salient of service delivery systems by vertical integration. Mostly 
between mobile SDP companies and other IT companies who see synergy effects between 
mobile and standard Internet delivery systems and to deliver full solutions to carriers and retails 
brands.  But also telecom infrastructure providers (both Nokia and Ericsson to name two), have 
deployed service delivery offerings as they move aggressively into maintenance of carrier 
networks. This vertical integration makes it increasingly difficult for smaller SDP vendors to 
survive due to increased cost pressure and service demands. 
 
Hughes’ concept of “reverse salient” (1983) can be used to see how in both the EU and Japan 
acquisitions of competitors and partners in the service delivery space sped up the integration of 
the content delivery process from 1999 and onwards: In the EU disproportionate resources from 
venture capitalists poured into marketing towards carriers to break their “not invented here” 
attitude towards outsourcing of key components in the delivery architecture. In Japan NTT 
DoCoMo broke new ground already in 1999 by overcoming the coordination challenge in the 
value chain: By doing it themselves with a compelling business model and technological lead the 
telecoms industry in Japan came to accept the i-mode approach, and much potential coordination 
cost in the value chain among the other actors was saved in the process.  
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Some key driving forces for integration and convergence between the mobile and fixed Internet 
in 2005 can be summarised in: 
 
• Technology components of the service delivery platform are becoming standardised 
and smaller players are merging into larger ones as margins decrease. 
 
• Carriers want to buy standard and exchangeable components after many experiments 
with small and proprietary systems the last 5 years. 
 
• Established media companies want to deliver their content by themselves, not only 
directly to carriers. They desire to plug into the carrier’s billing systems (through 
billing mediators), but deliver contents to end customers by themselves. 
 
5. Business Strategy & Technology Choices 2000-2005 
The mobile service value chain and related business strategies can be seen through our lens of 
coordination costs. All four actors have overlapping and unique core competences: carriers run 
their networks and bill customers for accessing them, content aggregators specialise in finding 
and deliver content to carriers or directly to customers, vendors of service delivery platforms 
focus on technology and delivery mechanisms, and retail brand makers look to expand with 
already successful products into the mobile distribution channel.  
 
In the value chain typically two large actors have much resources to spend: the carriers and the 
retails brands. But neither of them have originated in the mobile telecom industry, and in many 
cases lack a differentiated view of mobile consumer behaviour (mainly carriers) and underlying 
technologies (foremost retails brands). The typically smaller companies in content aggregation 
and service delivery often come from the same background: Set up just before or after 2000 by 
big telecom company drop-outs in order to exploit new business opportunities. Most content 
aggregators before 2003 used their own, or the carrier content delivery mechanisms. Many 
aggregators or SDP vendors still engage in both contents and service delivery solutions. 
Financial strains have been a close companion to most aggregators and SDP providers, with a 
few striking exceptions in primarily Japan (Bandai, Cybird, Index e.g.) but also the EU. 
Coordination costs for accessing the right branded content, often outside the national market, has 
been typical problems for aggregators. SDP providers, due to IT and telecoms convergence, have 
had the advantage of increasingly working with standard internet technologies, and thereby 
become partners with or subsidiaries to other IT companies. As technology providers, some SDP 
providers suffer from lacking information on consumer behaviour, or coordination costs in 
explaining and market their solutions to their customers. There are no clear activity boundaries 
between SDP vendors and the other actors, as service enabling technology is utilised throughout 
the value chain by several actors and no dominant designs can function as bench marks. The 
activity boundaries (Figure 1) could in many cases be argued to not contain necessary 
information required for an efficiently functioning seller-buyer market to exist. Management and 
integration, rather than markets, constitute the most efficient coordinating mechanism across 
such interfaces, called “interdependent interfaces” by Christensen et al (2002). This could be one 
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Since the beginning of i-mode in Japan in 1999, WAP/i-mode billing and not SMS billing on the 
carrier portal is the only way of charging for contents. Successful entrants have emphasized the 
carrier portal. Human relations and trust with the carrier is sometimes more important than 
technology choice.  In the EU the emergence of SMS billing as the dominant transaction form 
has enabled the off-portal business (and billing aggregators) to grow substantially, where direct 
contact with the carrier is not necessary for the service provider. Japan in 2000 was dominated 
by 10-20 large content providers and retail brands working directly with the carriers. These 
included Bandai, Cybird, Index, Giga Networks, and SEGA. The original content providers from 
1999 that showed “loyalty” at the beginning towards DoCoMo were rewarded with special 
relationships and became aggregators. Other content providers often had to take considerable 
coordination costs for communicating with the carriers through these aggregators. Service 
delivery platform providers worked to some degree with retail brands. The carriers coordinated 
portal management, handset releases, and got their revenues mainly from traffic/packet fees and  
a much smaller share from the content fees (the carriers kept 9% of content fees). The content 
provider could keep 91% of content revenues, but packet fees constituted the bulk of revenues 
from the mobile Internet system at the time (which NTT DoCoMo didn’t share). Only monthly 
subscription was available as the charging method. It was a clear business case for all parties and 
coordination costs were directed towards publishing content on the official portal. 
 
The EU in 2000 saw the carriers trying to do “everything” by themselves: aggregating and even 
creating content. The revenue share for content providers was generally less than 50%, and users 
paid for transmission time, not traffic, as necessary GPRS systems and related micro billing 
systems weren’t available until 2002 in most markets. There was no clear business case for 
content providers, so SMS outside the carrier portal became the revenue driver once carriers 
opened up their billing systems for third parties.  
 
In 2005 the successful model in Japan hasn’t changed substantially. The same players occupy the 
same space with the exception of large retail brands managing their relation with carriers directly, 
and off-portal sites for advertising and other consumer interaction (non-charged) has been 
booming. Interaction between web pages and the mobile Internet has also increased. 
 
In 2005 the EU looks very different from the awkward situation in 2000. The carrier portals have 
been marginalized for SMS services (that have gone off-portal) and service delivery platforms 
have become a key element for cost effective mobile Internet sites in the growing competition 
among carriers, retail brands and content providers. Several carriers have even outsourced portal 
management and focus solely on wholesale of data and SMS. To some extent service delivery 
platforms emerging as system products in 2002-2005 was a disruptive technology to most 
content aggregators and even carriers who had developed their own proprietary service delivery 
mechanisms. But many carriers in the EU (Japanese carriers only share their billing API) chose 
to procure new service delivery platforms, or at least provide open APIs to their SMS (most) and 
WAP (fewer) billing systems to trusted partners between 2003 and 2005. Most retail brands 
(including game makers) by 2003 hadn’t ventured into mobile service delivery, so SDPs were 
not a disruptive technology to them. Carriers and brands launching mobile services are 
increasingly concerned with commercial aspects of content editing and retailing rather than the 
basic functionality of handset rendering and content management. Customer business benefits 
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rather than technology have become selling points and the main source for coordination costs for 




Notes to figure 3:   
• Arrows denote main areas of activity and dotted arrows activities that were undertaken 
often enough to affect the competitive landscape. 
• Mobile CP (mobile content provider) is defined as a company started up for the sole 
purpose of creating, aggregating and/or distributing content via the mobile Internet or 
SMS. 
• SDP providers enable the other actors to publish raw content files for all handsets. 
• The clear activity zone of Japanese carriers can be compared to the wide scope of EU 




Notes to figure 4: 
 
• The reasons for increasing market demand for SDPs are different in Japan and the EU. 
Japan: network effects and success of the mobile Internet means that sites are launched 
rapidly, but only about 10% are profitable. To cut costs on manual updates is crucial.  
The EU: The technical complexity of delivering contents on multiple networks makes it 
necessary to focus on core skills and partner with other value chain players. 
• The boarder between the 4 actors is blurring in the EU, as technology focus and profit 
zones are changing. Some technologies become commoditized (content management 
systems, compression) while others evolve as increasingly important with special 
suppliers (site builders, DRM). But the over-all trend is that technology matters less and 
fully serviced storefront offerings attract the cash rich players: retail brands and carriers. 
 
Figure 5 shows that although the same technology interaction is used in Japan and the EU for 
content delivery, what differs between the Japanese and EU market is to what extent certain 
technologies are used or omitted, which in turn interact with the business strategy of the four key 
actors (carriers, content aggregators, SDP providers, retail brands). Increasing cost focus will 
most probably create a traditional two-fold segmentation in a maturing market: specialized 
component makers, and large system retailers who market off-the-shelf solutions. It can be 
argued that similar patterns of technology convergence in the SDP markets of Japan and the EU 
is a strong indicator of a global IT and telecom convergence in general, as the mobile Internet 




The creative process of producing “mobile” (audio, video, games, images) contents is 
decreasingly held back by limitations of the handsets. This supports two parallel developments: 
integration of the steps in the delivery mechanism, and decreasing need of reformatting the 
content. Nevertheless there are several steps before even a standard MP3 file can be delivered 
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from a content provider to the handset in a correct way. Not to mention an analogue image that 
needs even more formatting before being downloaded to the user handset. From an initial WAP 
focus in the EU, SMS came to take over as delivery format during 2002-2005 in the EU. In 2005 
the mobile Internet (WAP/i-mode) has experienced a revival due to better technology and 
interest from media companies to offer users a richer experience. 
 
Software convergence in the delivery mechanism means that encoding and decoding increasingly 
involve standard file formats, so that off-the shelf tools can be modified to work with mobile 
content, instead of a need for custom made and expensive new tools. Similarly, handset 
recognition, content management (including database tools) and delivery mechanisms were 
being offered in 2005 as modules, that can be integrated through APIs  (application 
programming interfaces) by non-mobile players who want to offer their contents. Hosted 
services make the technology components in an SDP even more flexible to deploy into customer 
solutions. Services are simply offered on-line (DRM encapsulation, video trans-coding, third 
party management) or as a fully hosted service with web interface access. Many early systems 
demanded on-site deployment of servers, but the flexibility and low upfront capital expenditure 
for hosted services, have increased the attractiveness of SDPs. Financial strength is also 
becoming a prerequisite for bidding on projects for two reasons: Carrier and retail brands want 
long-term suppliers, all partners bidding in the same project are only as strong as the weakest 
link. 
 
In figure 5 an overview is given of how the different parts of the service delivery platform 
architecture have been used in the Japanese and EU markets during 2005. Carriers in Japan early 
on demanded advanced device discovery and on-the-fly trans-coding for fitting images to the 
screen. In the EU there has been an early interest in streaming (media player) and DRM, both  
driven by the media industry. Apart from these differences, the technology focus is similar, 
continuing to converge and service delivery system innovation has become a global rather than 
local phenomena. A time-lag can be seen between Japan and The EU: large CPs in Japan just 
started to outsource content management/adaptation, since mobile sites are larger but fewer in 
Japan than in the EU, and there are only three operating carriers. SDPs are becoming a part of the 
corporate IT systems with new demands: administrative systems, service extension through third 
party solutions, compatibility with carrier walled gardens, quick scalability, and system 
integration resources through partnerships with established IT vendors (such as IBM, Accenture 
etc). As standard Internet formats become dominant, the weight of innovation will change from 
specialized telecoms solutions into adapted IT solutions for the mobile space. The business 
strategy chart (Fig 4) and the technology choice diagram below (Fig 5) are interdependent of 
each other, as technology choice is part of managing a certain activity.  
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6. Conclusions: 
Before the launch of the mobile Internet in 1999 (and earlier) there was a view among observers 
that technology architecture and standards would shape the necessary business strategies. But a 
plethora of actors and events interplayed and business strategies rather evolved as a response to 
network effects in an emerging business-technology system. We have studied the main reverse 
salient in this mobile Internet technology system, mobile service delivery platforms (SDP), and 
its role as indicator of these system changes. Comparing the EU with Japan we see an 
exploration phase with different approaches involving disruptive technologies beginning 1999, to 
a phase of differentiation of technology and business strategies, then back to a convergence of 
technology where effects of coordination costs affect the reordering of the value chain in 2005 
and where common themes of business strategy emerge in both markets. Other conclusions are 
summarised below: 
 
Mobile content delivery – visualized in this paper by service delivery platforms - is becoming 
commoditized and technical differentiation becomes less important:  
Carriers and brands launching services are more concerned with commercial aspects of content 
editing and retailing than basic functionality of handset rendering and content management.  
 
Building partnerships to become future-proof in the eyes of customers critical: 
To be seen as a viable partner for multiple business scenarios, the SDP providers must leap into 
building commercial networks as they become part of corporate IT systems. Financial strength is 
also becoming a prerequisite for bidding on projects. 
 
In the light of Telecoms and IT convergence, service delivery innovation will increasingly take 
place in collaboration between the telecoms and IT industry: 
As standard Internet formats become dominant, the weight of innovation will change from 
specialized telecoms solutions into adapted IT solutions for the mobile space. SDPs evolve into 
integrated components where standard Internet technology increases in importance as handsets 
continue to get more advanced. 
 
Service delivery technology choices in Japan and the EU are similar and converging:  
The market is getting crowded so expertise in certain areas and open APIs being populated by 
third parties are the only ways to keep up with new process innovations. Two players will remain 
in the SDP segment: specialized component makers, and large system retailers who market off- 
the-shelf solutions. It can be argued that the similar patterns of convergence in the SDP markets 
of Japan and the EU is a strong indicator of a global IT and telecom convergence in general. This 
is due to the central role of SDPs as glue between end-users and the media industry. 
 
Mobile service delivery is the last reverse salient to be solved in the mobile Internet  system:  
Mobile infrastructure and handset products have both entered mass production, dominant designs 
prevail, and  open APIs for third parties are provided. For mobile service delivery platforms, the 
third main component of the mobile Internet technology system, underlying technologies have 
been identified by actors in the value chain. Massive resources are currently being invested by 
actors in both the mobile and PC industry to achieve new mobile service delivery innovations. 
This will eventually enable a fix to the mobile service delivery as a reverse salient (Hughes, 
1983) and result in a higher net output and load factor of the mobile Internet system as a whole. 
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Appendix: Figures and Tables 
 































































Figure 2. The underlying technologies for mobile service delivery 
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Figure 3. Activities as business strategy among actors in mobile service delivery, 2000 
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Figure 4. Activities as business strategy among actors in mobile service delivery, 2005  
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Figure 5. Technology Choices in Japan and the EU for service delivery platforms, 2005 
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Figure 6. The service delivery platform evolution, the trend towards more complex systems 
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Table 1 
Japan/EU, comparison of business strategy, year 2000/2005 
 
 Carrier Content 
Provider 
SDP provider Retail Brands 
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